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Searching for Effective Teachers with Imperfect Information
Douglas O. Staiger and Jonah E. Rockoff
Douglas O. Staiger is John French Professor of Economics, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New
Hampshire. Jonah E. Rockoff is Sidney Taurel Associate Professor of Business, Columbia
Business School, New York City, New York. Their e-mail addresses are
<Douglas.O.Staiger@dartmouth.edu> and <jonah.rockoff@columbia.edu>.

Teaching may be the most-scrutinized occupation in the economy. Over the past four
decades, empirical researchers—many of them economists—have accumulated an impressive
amount of evidence on teachers: the heterogeneity in teacher productivity, the rise in
productivity associated with teaching credentials and on-the-job experience, rates of turnover,
the costs of recruitment, the relationship between supply and quality, the effect of class size and
the monetary value of academic achievement gains over a student’s lifetime. Since the passage
of the No Child Left Behind Act, along with a number of state-level educational initiatives, the
data needed to estimate individual teacher performance based on student achievement gains have
become more widely available. However, there have been relatively few efforts to examine the
implications of this voluminous literature on teacher performance. In this paper, we ask what the
existing evidence implies for how school leaders might recruit, evaluate, and retain teachers.
We begin by summarizing the evidence on five key points, referring to existing work and
to evidence we have accumulated from our research with the nation’s two largest school districts:
Los Angeles and New York City. First, teachers display considerable heterogeneity in their
effects on student achievement gains. The standard deviation across teachers in their impact on
student achievement gains is on the order of 0.1 to 0.2 student-level standard deviations, which
would improve the median student’s test score 4 to 8 percentiles in a single year.1 Second,
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The metric of standard deviations is commonly used to assess the effect of educational
interventions, and we will use it throughout this paper. To provide some context for readers
Copyright © 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 by the
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estimates of teacher effectiveness based on student achievement data are noisy measures and can
be thought of as having reliability in the range of 30 to 50 percent. Third, teachers’ effectiveness
rises rapidly in the first year or two of their teaching careers but then quickly levels out. Fourth,
the primary cost of teacher turnover is not the direct cost of hiring and firing, but rather is the
loss to students who will be taught by a novice teacher rather than one with several years of
experience. Fifth, it is difficult to identify those teachers who will prove more effective at the
time of hire. As a result, better teachers can only be identified after some evidence on their actual
job performance has accumulated.
We then explore what these facts imply for how principals and school districts should act,
using a simple model in which schools must search for teachers using noisy signals of teacher
effectiveness. Due to a lack of information available at the time of hire, we will argue for a hiring
process that is not highly selective—that is, while it might require evidence of general
educational achievement like a college degree, it would not require individuals to make costly
up-front specific investments before being permitted to teach. We then argue that, given the
substantial observed heterogeneity of teacher effects, the modest rise in productivity with on-thejob experience, and the fact that tenure is a lifetime job, tenure protections should be limited to
those who meet a very high bar. Even with the imprecise estimates of teacher effectiveness
currently available, our simulations suggest that a strategy that would sample extensively from
the pool of potential teachers but offer tenure only to a small percentage could yield substantial
annual gains in student achievement.
The implications of our analysis are strikingly different from current practice. Schools
and school districts attempt to screen at the point of hiring and require significant investment in
education-specific coursework but then grant tenure status to teachers as a matter of course after
two to three years on the job. Performance evaluation is typically a perfunctory exercise and, at
least officially, very few teachers are considered ineffective (Weisberg, Sexton, Mulhern, and
Keeling, 2009). Rather than screening at the time of hire, the evidence on heterogeneity of
teacher performance suggests a better strategy would be identifying large differences between

unversed in this literature, the gap in achievement between poor and nonpoor students (or
between black and white students) in the United States is roughly 0.8–0.9 standard deviations
(authors’ calculations based on data from the 2009 National Assessment of Educational
Progress).
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teachers by observing the first few years of teaching performance and retaining only the highestperforming teachers.

Five Facts about Teacher Effectiveness
Any approach to recruiting and retaining teachers is based, at least implicitly, on a set of
beliefs. Here, we describe the evidence on five key parameters regarding teacher effectiveness.

Fact 1: Teacher Productivity Based on Gains in Student Achievement is Heterogeneous.
The fact that teachers are heterogeneous in their productivity suggests that there are
potentially large gains to students if it is possible for school leaders to attract and retain highly
effective teachers, and conversely to discourage or at least to avoid giving tenure to ineffective
teachers.
More than three decades ago, Hanushek (1971) and Murnane (1975) were the first
economists to report large differences in student achievement in different teachers’ classrooms,
even after controlling for students’ prior achievement and characteristics. That literature has
accelerated in recent years. Especially following the No Child Left Behind Act, many states and
school districts began collecting annual data on students and matching it to teachers.2 Research
has produced remarkably consistent estimates of the heterogeneity in teacher impacts in different
sites. For example, using data from Texas, Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005) find that a
standard deviation in teacher quality is associated with 0.11 student-level standard deviations in
math and 0.095 standard deviations in reading. Using data from two school districts in New
Jersey, Rockoff (2004) reports that one standard deviation in teacher effects is associated with a
2

The data requirements for measuring heterogeneity in teaching effectiveness are high. First,
one needs longitudinal data on achievement for individual students matched to specific teachers.
Second, achievement data are needed on an annual basis to be able to track gains for each student
over a single school year. (Prior to the No Child Left Behind legislation, many states tested at
longer intervals, such as fourth and eighth grade.) Third, panel data on teachers are required as
well, to be able to track performance of individual teachers over time. Teacher-level panel data
are needed to account for school-level or classroom-level shocks to student achievement that
contribute to the measurement error in classroom-level measures. In this journal, Kane and
Staiger (2002) showed that conventional estimates of sampling error cannot account for the lack
of persistence in school-level value-added estimates. There appear to be other school-level and
classroom-level sources of error.
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0.1 student-level standard deviation in achievement. Using data from Chicago, Aaronson,
Barrow, and Sander (2007) report that a standard deviation in teacher quality is associated with a
difference in math performance of 0.09 to 0.16 student-level standard deviations.3
How much should we care about these differences in effectiveness across teachers? To
attach an approximate dollar value to them, one needs an estimate of the value of student
achievement over the course of a student’s lifetime. There is a long tradition in labor economics
estimating the relationship between various types of test scores and the earnings of early-career
workers (for example, Murnane, Willett, and Levy, 1995; Neal and Johnson, 1996).4 Kane and
Staiger (2002) estimated that the value of a one standard deviation gain in math scores would
have been worth $110,000 at age 18 using the Murnane et al. estimates, and $256,000 using the
Neal and Johnson results. This implies that a one standard deviation increase in teacher
effectiveness (that is, one that leads to an increase of about 0.15 standard deviations of student
achievement for 20 students) has a value of around $330,000 to $760,000.
As several recent papers remind us, the statistical assumptions required for the
identification of causal teacher effects with observational data are extraordinarily strong and
rarely tested (Andrabi, Das, Khwaja, and Zajonc, 2009; McCaffrey, Lockwood, Koretz, Louis,
and Hamilton, 2004; Raudenbush, 2004; Rothstein, 2010; Rubin, Stuart, and Zanutto, 2004;
Todd and Wolpin, 2003). Teachers may be assigned classrooms of students that differ in
unmeasured ways—such as consisting of more motivated students, or students with stronger
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Aaronson, Barrow, and Sander (2007) report the variance in teacher quality to be .02 to .06
grade-level equivalents (adjusted for sampling error). In table 1, they report the standard
deviation in grade-level equivalents of 8th grade students to be 1.55
( .02 / 155
. = .09, .06 / 155
. = .16 ). Their study adjusted for sampling variation, but not for other
classroom level sources of error.
4
Murnane, Willett, and Levy (1995) estimate that a one standard deviation difference in math
test performance is associated with an 8 percent hourly wage increase for men and a 12.6 percent
increase in for women. These estimates may understate the value of academic achievement since
the authors also control for years of schooling completed. Neal and Johnson (1996), who do not
condition on educational attainment, estimate that an improvement of one standard deviation in
test performance is associated with 18.7 and 25.6 percent increases in hourly wages for men and
women, respectively. Of course, the cross-sectional relationship between tested achievement and
earnings may overstate the causal value of academic achievement. However, while there have
been attempts to estimate the causal value of years of schooling, we are not aware of estimates of
the causal value of academic achievement.
4

unmeasured prior achievement or more engaged parents—that result in varying student
achievement gains.
Despite these concerns, several pieces of evidence suggest that the magnitude of variation
in teacher effects is driven by real differences in teacher quality. First, estimates tend to be
highly correlated across a wide variety of specifications (Harris and Sass, 2006). Second,
researchers have consistently found strong correlations between teacher effect estimates and
evaluations made by school principals and other professional educators (Murnane, 1975; Jacob
and Lefgren, 2008; Harris and Sass, 2009; Rockoff and Speroni, 2010; Tyler, Taylor, Kane, and
Wooten, 2010). Third, while most studies of teacher effects rely on assumptions regarding
matching of students with teachers at the classroom level, Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005)
use a completely different approach that does not rely on this assumption and find similar
estimates to the rest of the literature.
Finally, two studies based on random assignment of teachers to classrooms have found
variation in teacher effects consistent with nonexperimental estimates, suggesting that estimated
differences in teacher effectiveness are not driven by student sorting. Nye, Konstantopoulos, and
Hedges (2004) reexamined data from the Tennessee STAR classroom size experiment, in which
teachers were randomly assigned to classes of a given size. The differences in classroom-level
student achievement that emerged within given class size groups were larger than would have
been expected to occur due to chance and strikingly similar in magnitude to those estimated in
nonexperimental studies. Kane and Staiger (2008) study a recent experiment in Los Angeles
Unified School District in which pairs of teachers were randomly assigned to classrooms within
the same elementary school and grade. They found that nonexperimental value-added estimates
from a pre-experimental period were able to predict student achievement differences following
random assignment: a one-point difference between randomly-assigned teachers in preexperimental value added was associated with a one-point difference in student achievement
following random assignment. Thus, the nonexperimental estimates for individual teachers were
unbiased predictors of a teacher’s impact on student achievement in the experiment.

Fact 2: Estimates of Heterogeneous Teacher Effects Include a Substantial Noise
Component.

5

Ideally, estimates of the amount that teachers affect student achievement would be the
same across classrooms or from year to year within the same teacher, but this does not hold true
in practice. The error in estimates of teacher effects on student achievement derives from at least
two sources. The first is sampling variation. The typical elementary classroom may have 20 to
25 students per year (although middle and high school teachers have somewhat larger classes and
typically teach multiple sections). With samples of such modest size, naturally occurring
variation in the make-up of a teacher’s classroom from year to year will produce variation in a
teacher’s estimated effect. However, volatility in teacher (and school) effects exceeds that
predicted by sampling error alone (Kane and Staiger, 2002; Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger, 2008).
The source of this second type of error—which can perhaps more accurately be thought of as
nonpersistent variation in estimates of teacher effects on student achievement—could include a
broad range of factors influencing the measured achievement gains of groups of students: for
example, interactions between a specific teacher’s lesson plans and the test used in a given year,
an (unpredictably) disruptive student that drags down his/her classmates, a dog-barking in the
parking lot on the day of the test, or more mysterious forces that fall under the broad category of
“classroom chemistry.”
For present purposes, any nonpersistent variation in a teacher’s measured impact on
student achievement represents estimation error. One approach to estimating the proportion of
variance due to nonpersistent sources is to study the correlation in estimated impacts across
classrooms taught by the same teacher. If a teacher’s estimated impact, Yt, represents the sum of
a persistent component, µ, and an uncorrelated nonpersistent error, εt, then the correlation
between the estimated effect this year and last year—that is, between Yt and Yt – 1—represents an
estimate of the reliability of the teacher-level estimate in any given year. Table 1 reports the
standard deviation in estimated teacher effects, the estimated reliability (as measured by the
correlation across classrooms taught by the same teacher), and implied standard deviation in true
teacher impacts (σµ) for teachers in two school districts: Los Angeles Unified and New York
City. When reported in terms of the student-level standard deviation in test scores in a given
grade and subject, the standard deviation in estimated value added for teachers was remarkably
similar in the two districts, with estimates in both math and English Language Arts in the narrow
range from .23 to .27. Although the estimated reliability of teacher effects was higher in math
than in English Language Arts, and higher in Los Angeles than in New York City, all the
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reliability estimates suggest that there is considerable error or volatility in the teacher impact
estimates. Indeed, more than half of the variation in estimated impacts in math and English
Language Arts are nonpersistent. The standard deviation of the persistent teacher effect is
between .12 and .19, similar to that found in the previous literature discussed above.

Fact 3: Teachers Improve Substantially in Their First Few Years on the Job.
Table 1 also reports the degree to which average teacher effects on student achievement
differ from that of experienced teachers during the first few years on the job in these same two
districts. In both Los Angeles and New York, teacher effects on student achievement appear to
rise rapidly during the first several years on the job and then flatten out. This finding has been
replicated in a number of states and districts (Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain, 2005; Clotfelter,
Ladd, and Vigdor, 2006; Harris and Sass, 2006; Jacob, 2007). When assigned to a first-year
teacher, the average student gains .06 to .08 standard deviations of achievement less than
observably similar students assigned to experienced teachers. However, the achievement gains
of students assigned to second-year teachers lagged those in more experienced teachers’
classrooms by only .01 to .04 standard deviations. In Los Angeles, students of third-year
teachers saw gains comparable to those of more experienced teachers, while there was a small
difference for third-year teachers in New York (.01 to .02 standard deviations).

Fact 4: The Main Cost of Teacher Turnover is the Reduction in Student Achievement when
an Experienced Teacher is Replaced by a Novice, not Direct Hiring Costs.
Milanowski and Odden (2007) carefully studied costs of teacher recruitment and hiring in
a large urban Midwestern school district. They estimate total costs of roughly $8,200: recruiting
costs per vacancy of $1,100 in central office staff time and $2,600 in school-level staff time, plus
$4,500 for the cost of training a new teacher. In addition, some of these costs will be defrayed
by the salaries earned by new teachers, which are typically lower than the salaries of the teachers
they replace.
Based on the gains that teachers make in their first few years of experience, every time a
school district loses an experienced teacher with two or more years of experience and is forced to
hire a novice teacher, the students assigned to the novice teacher over the first two years of their
career lose roughly .10 standard deviations in student achievement. As discussed above,
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estimates suggest a .10 standard deviation gain in math scores has a value of roughly $10,000 to
$25,000 per student. Thus, the economic cost of lost academic achievement when replacing an
experienced elementary teacher with a novice would be roughly $10,000 to $25,000 times 20
students per class—or $200,000 to $500,000. This is obviously a back-of-the-envelope
calculation, but it dwarfs the direct costs of teacher hiring.

Fact 5: School Leaders Have Very Little Ability to Select Effective Teachers During the
Initial Hiring Process.
Reliable screening at the hiring stage would be an efficient tool for raising student
achievement because it avoids the cost of placing ineffective teachers in front of students.
Unfortunately, there is scant evidence that school districts or principals can effectively separate
effective and ineffective teachers when they make hiring decisions. Indeed, this notion is
supported by the fact that most of the variation in teacher effects occurs among teachers hired
into the same school.
One of the most interesting pieces of evidence on this topic comes from a natural
experiment which occurred in California in the late 1990s (Kane and Staiger, 2005). Beginning
in the academic year 1996–1997, the state of California provided cash incentives to school
districts to keep class sizes in kindergarten through third grade to a maximum of 20 children.
To take advantage of the state incentive, school districts throughout the state dramatically
increased hiring of new elementary teachers. In the years before 1997, Los Angeles Unified
School District hired 1,200 to 1,400 elementary school teachers per year, but in 1997 Los
Angeles nearly tripled the number of elementary school teachers it hired, to 3,335, and continued
to hire at more than double its earlier level for the next five years.
If the district were able to discern teacher effectiveness in the hiring process, we would
have expected a large increase in hiring to have had a negative effect on the average
effectiveness of the teachers hired. Such an effect would likely have been heightened by the fact
that nearly every other school district in California was on a hiring spree because of the same
state law, the fact that teacher compensation in Los Angeles did not increase more than usual
during this period, and that the proportion of new hires in L.A. without teaching credentials rose
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from 59 percent to 72 percent.5 However, Kane and Staiger (2005) find that, despite the size of
the hiring bubble, value added in the period 2001–2004 for teachers hired in 1997 was no worse
than for teachers hired in the years immediately before 1997.6 Overall, there was no evidence
that tripling the number of new hires had any effect on their average effectiveness in the
classroom.7
Other evidence on this issue comes from decades of work in which researchers have
tried, unsuccessfully, to link teacher characteristics observable to both researchers and principals
to student outcomes (see reviews by Hanushek, 1986, 1997; Jacob, 2007). With the exception of
teaching experience, there is little to suggest that the credentials commonly used to determine
teacher certification and pay are related to teachers’ impacts on student outcomes. Some studies
find that a teacher’s academic background (like college grade point average or SAT test scores)
is related to student outcomes, but Ballou (1996) finds that teaching applicants with strong
academic records are no more likely to be hired by school principals.
More recent work suggests that selecting teaching candidates who are likely to be
effective is difficult, but not impossible. For example, several studies have estimated the effect
of novice teachers recruited under the Teach for America program (Decker, Mayer, and
Glazerman, 2004; Boyd, Grossman, Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff, 2006; Kane, Rockoff, and
Staiger, 2008). Teach for America is highly selective, drawing applicants from the top
universities in the country and offering positions to only a small fraction of the thousands of
individuals who apply. However, these applicants have not generally taken college courses in
5

It may seem surprising that the fraction of teachers without credentials didn’t rise by more, but
the number of individuals with teaching certification that do not teach is quite large. Data from
the Baccalaureate and Beyond study indicate that roughly one in five college graduates receive
teaching certification in the ten years after graduation, but 45 percent of college graduates that
obtained teaching certification are not teaching, and 15 percent have never taught (author’s
calculations using National Center for Education Statistics QuickStats on 6/8/2010).
6
Their analysis focuses on grades two through five in Los Angeles from 2001 through 2004. By
2001, roughly two-thirds of both the 1996 and 1997 hiring cohorts were still employed by the
district; thus, there is little evidence to suggest any differential selective attrition for the larger
cohort. Also, while their value-added model controls for baseline scores and other student
characteristics, there was virtually no difference in the types of students to which the cohorts had
been assigned.
7
This evidence runs counter to the prevailing wisdom among some policy analysts that it was a
decline in the average quality of the teaching force that accounts for the failure to see an increase
in achievement in California resulting from the class size reduction (Bohrnstedt and Stecher,
2002).
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K–12 education nor have they majored in education. Decker, Mayer, and Glazerman (2004) use
random assignment to estimate the effect of the program in elementary schools and find that
students assigned to Teach For America members scored 2 percentile points (0.095 standard
deviations) higher in math and no higher in reading than those assigned to other teachers. Using
nonexperimental data from New York City, in Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger (2008), we find
positive effects of Teach For America teachers in math of .02 standard deviations and no
statistically significant effect in English Language Arts. Boyd, Grossman, Lankford, Loeb, and
Wyckoff (2006) report comparable results, also using data from New York City.
More evidence comes from studies collecting data on recently-hired novice math teachers
in New York City. In Rockoff, Jacob, Kane, and Staiger (forthcoming), we collected information
on a number of nontraditional predictors of effectiveness—including teaching-specific content
knowledge, cognitive ability, personality traits, feelings of self-efficacy, and scores on a
commercially available teacher selection instrument—and then used these to predict a teacher’s
effect on math achievement. When the variables were combined into two primary factors
summarizing cognitive and noncognitive skills, teachers who were one standard deviation higher
on either the cognitive or noncognitive factor were found to raise student achievement in math
by .033 student-level standard deviations more than teachers with average skill levels. Those
who were one standard deviation higher on both measures were estimated to raise achievement
by .066 standard deviations. Rockoff and Speroni (2010) examined the achievement of students
assigned to teachers recruited through an alternative certification program—the New York City
Teaching Fellows—and asked whether achievement gains were higher for students assigned to
teachers rated as more attractive candidates by the certification program’s interview protocol.
They found no significant relationship with English Language Arts test scores and a small
positive relationship with math test scores: a one standard deviation in interview score was
associated with .013 standard deviations higher math achievement gain.

Implications for How We Should (and Should Not) Search for Effective Teachers
Here, we first lay out a way of thinking about the appropriate search strategy for school
leaders based on these empirical findings. Based on this approach, we then present simulation
estimates of how these different strategies would affect average teacher productivity.

10

A Reservation Value or Cut-off Score Model
Suppose that school districts do not observe any useful pre-hire signal—there are a
substantial number of potential applicants for teaching jobs who appear to have the general skill
level to succeed in teaching, but we cannot tell in advance which ones will actually succeed.
However, after teachers accept a job, the school can observe the gains that students make in test
scores. Thus, the principal faces a search problem: the principal draws teachers from the
applicant pool, observes noisy signals over time about teacher productivity, and decides whether
to dismiss unproductive teachers and start the process over again. In this kind of model, the
optimal decision rule has a reservation property: at the end of a year, the principal makes a
decision on whether to dismiss a teacher if the expected effectiveness of that teacher, given the
information to date, lies below a reservation value.8
At a broad level, the principal should set the cut-off score where the productivity of the
marginal teacher is expected to be equal to the productivity of the average teacher. In other
words, this decision rule tells principals to keep only the rookies who are expected to be better
than the average teacher. Imagine if this were not true—that is, suppose the marginal teacher
were less productive than the average teacher. Then the school district could raise average
performance by raising its standard for new hires by a small amount. Likewise, if the marginal
teacher accepted under the standard were more productive than the average teacher, then the
district could raise average performance by lowering the cut-off score for new hires and adding
one more above-average teacher. This result is analogous to the usual result that average costs
are minimized at the point where marginal cost equals average cost.
However, determining the reservation value or cut-off score in practice will be complex.
The optimal reservation value depends on a set of underlying parameters similar to those already
discussed: the extent of variation in performance across teachers, the return to experience, the
number of years before tenure, the exogenous turnover rate, the size of the applicant pool, and
the magnitude of other hiring and firing costs. For example, if teachers are more heterogeneous,
then the potential benefits of greater selection are higher. However, if there is more noise (and
thus uncertainty) in the estimates of teacher heterogeneity, then the benefits of selection are

8

For a simple algebraic presentation of this model, with some discussion of its links to search
models with imperfect information in labor markets, see the online appendix available with this
paper at <http://www.e-jep.org>.
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lower. If the gains from teacher experience are worth more, then the cost of dismissing
experienced teachers and replacing them with novices is larger. If the exogenous turnover rate of
teachers is high, then the optimal cut-off for tenure falls because there is less benefit to giving
tenure to highly effective teachers if they do not stay long. Overall, the principal must set the bar
to trade off the short-term cost of replacing an experienced teacher with a rookie against the
long-term benefit of selecting only the most effective teachers.
In what follows, we report the results of Monte Carlo simulations that examine the
consequences of different approaches to teacher evaluation and retention. We use evidence on
key underlying parameters to calibrate the model; all of these values lie in the middle of the
estimates reported for Los Angeles and New York City in Table 1. We set the standard deviation
of the persistent teacher effect (in student-level standard deviation units) equal to 0.15, and the
reliability of the value-added measure (the ratio of the persistent variance to total variance) equal
to 40 percent. For the return to experience, we assume that a first- and second-year teacher’s
value added is –0.07 and –0.02 student standard deviations below the value added of teachers in
their third year or higher. We ignore the direct costs of hiring a new teacher. Finally, we assume
a maximum teaching career of 30 years and an exogenous turnover rate of 5 percent, which is
approximately the proportion of experienced teachers who leave the Los Angeles and New York
City districts each year.

Tenure or Dismiss after One Year
We begin with a basic example in which the principal must either dismiss or tenure a
teacher after one year of teaching based on just one year of student value-added data. Figure 1
reports the expected steady-state impact of dismissing a given proportion of teachers (the bottom
axis) on value added of the average teacher (left axis, solid line) and on the proportion of the
teacher workforce who are in their first year of teaching (right axis, dashed line).
The implications of Figure 1 are stark. First, the simulation suggests there are substantial
gains from using value-added information to dismiss ineffective teachers and that the principal
should set a very high bar for tenure. To maximize average value added, about 80 percent of
teachers should be dismissed after their first year. This aggressive strategy would raise the
average value added of teachers in the school to just over 0.08; put differently, the effectiveness
of the average teacher (including the rookies) would be greater than roughly 70 percent of the
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tenured teachers under the old system. Moreover, it is not the case that most of the gain comes
from dismissing the very lowest-performing teachers. Indeed, until the principal reaches the
optimum, the gain to being increasingly selective in who receives tenure is roughly linear. For
example, if the principal dismissed the 40 percent of first-year teachers with the lowest value
added, rather than 80 percent, the average value added among teachers in the school would
increase by roughly 0.045 in the long run.
While these results are surprising relative to current practice, there are a number of clear
reasons why principals might choose to dismiss a large proportion of novice teachers. Even
unreliable performance measures such as value added can identify substantial and lasting
differences across teachers. Differences in teacher effects are large and persistent relative to the
short-lived costs of hiring a new teacher. Since the typical teacher getting tenure will teach for
ten years or more, the benefit from setting a high tenure bar will be large. Of course, such
unreliable measures make mistakes. But the long-run cost of retaining an ineffective teacher far
outweighs the short-run cost of dismissing an effective teacher. Moreover, because of the
uncertainty at the time of hire, new teachers have considerable option value; for every five new
hires, one will be identified as a highly effective teacher and provide many years of valuable
service.
There are many reasons why these simulations could overstate the benefits or understate
the costs of such an aggressive tenure policy, and we have tried to enumerate a number of them
here. In general, for reasonable variations in the parameter values, these issues do not alter our
qualitative conclusions.
First, we may have understated the hiring and firing costs facing a principal. As we
discussed earlier, the main cost of turnover is the lower effectiveness of new teachers, which
corresponds to a cost of well over $100,000 in terms of foregone future student earnings.
However, even if we double the difference in value added between rookies and experienced
teachers (that is, from 0.07 to .14 student level standard deviations), the optimal dismissal rate
remains over 75 percent.
Second, we may have understated turnover rates among tenured teachers, especially if
principals focus on their own school (rather than the district as a whole) and highly effective
teachers are more likely to move to other schools. Similarly, principals may discount the future
more highly because of their own likelihood of leaving the school, or because they believe that
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teacher effects will not persist into the future (although the evidence suggests otherwise).
However, if we double the exogenous annual turnover rate from 5 to 10 percent, the optimal
dismissal rate remains over 70 percent.
Third, we may have understated the cost of recruiting teachers. The simulation indicates
that a dismissal rate of 80 percent would result in more than 20 percent of the workforce being
novice teachers at any time, more than double the current proportion of novices in Los Angeles
and New York City. Districts would have to hire many more teachers to accommodate this
strategy, and these new hires would presumably demand higher wages to compensate for the
substantial risk of being dismissed. This is particularly true if we continue to require costly upfront teaching-specific training. However, even a doubling of current teacher salaries would not
be enough to offset the benefits of an aggressive dismissal policy, since a .08 annual increase in
student achievement is worth more than $100,000 per teacher.
Fourth, our simulations focus on the steady state, and we have ignored what happens
along the way. This may be important if we discount the earnings of future children relative to
current children. Specifically, for a school that starts with all new teachers, an aggressive
dismissal policy will result in high fractions of inexperienced teachers in the short run even if the
equilibrium percentage of rookies is lower. For example, if we compare a policy of retaining the
top 20 percent of new teachers with retaining 90 percent, average teacher effectiveness would be
slightly lower in the first two years after implementing the more aggressive policy, turn positive
in year three, and approach the steady state gains after roughly ten years. Nevertheless, we find
the optimal dismissal rate is still above 70 percent for annual discount rates in a reasonable range
(say 2 to 8 percent), and falls to 50 percent only with annual discount rates on the order of 15
percent.
Fifth, there may be spillover effects in teaching, where good teachers help raise the
achievement of their colleagues students (Jackson and Bruegmann, 2009; Koedell, forthcoming).
This has two offsetting effects in the context of our analysis. Spillover effects imply that our
estimate of the variation in how teachers impact their own students is overstated (because some
of the observed effect is due to their colleagues). However, if this bias is roughly 20 percent, as
suggested by Jackson and Bruegmann (2009), so that the true standard deviation in persistent
teacher effects was 0.12 rather than 0.15, the optimal dismissal rate would still be 79 percent in
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our model. Moreover, spillover effects will also increase the benefits of filling schools entirely
with highly effective teachers and could easily imply higher optimal dismissal rates.
Sixth, we have assumed that teachers who do not receive tenure exit the teaching
workforce. If teaching effectiveness is measured with error and principals have no power to
screen among candidates, then dismissed teachers could move to another school and hope for
better luck in their evaluation. If this occurred, the average quality of the applicant pool would
decline. This type of phenomenon—poorly performing teachers moving to new schools,
typically those serving more disadvantaged students (discussed in Boyd, Grossman, Lankford,
Loeb, and Wyckoff, 2008)—is already well-known in education, and is referred to as “the dance
of the lemons.” This suggests that principals could benefit their colleagues at other schools by
sharing performance information on teachers. However, if schools were highly selective in
granting tenure, it might also be true that teachers who receive a bad signal regarding their
effectiveness would have less incentive to “shop around.”9
Seventh, there is evidence that the impact of a teacher on the achievement of current
students may fade out over time as those students progress through their remaining years of
school (Jacob, Lefgren, and Sims, 2008; Kane and Staiger, 2008). It is unclear whether this
greatly weakens the case for raising teacher quality. We do not know whether fadeout is a
general phenomenon or whether it is a result of current levels of heterogeneity in teacher
effectiveness. For example, having a highly effective teacher in the previous year may do a
student little good if they are placed with a highly ineffective teacher this year, or if their
classmates were placed with a highly ineffective teacher the previous year. In other words,
teacher effects might not fade out if a group of students is given a sequence of highly effective
teachers. Moreover, raising a student’s academic achievement as measured in a particular grade
may still be valuable even if the student’s score in later grade levels do not remain at the

9

A similar complication arises if teaching skills are partially related to subject matter, grade
level, or the teacher–school match. The evidence on the specificity of teaching skill is mixed
(Boyd, Grossman, Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff, 2008; Lockwood and McCaffrey, 2009;
Jackson, 2010), but it is reasonable to believe that, say, a mediocre teacher of high school
physics in Harlem may have made a good fifth grade math teacher in Brooklyn Heights, or vice
versa. If principals do have access to information on the past performance of teachers who did
not make tenure, specificity in skill can simply be interpreted as an additional source of error.
This may lead principals to be more willing to “take a chance” on a teacher who just missed
tenure by trying them in a different subject, grade, or teaching environment.
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improved level. For instance, a better knowledge of numerical operations may still be valuable in
the labor market even if it does not lead to better test scores in algebra. Nevertheless, we do
view “fade-out” as a primary empirical issue, not just in studies of teachers, but in studies of
educational interventions more broadly (for example, Currie and Thomas, 1995).
Finally, we may have overstated the reliability of value-added measures. We address this
issue in considerable detail below. However, even if we cut the reliability of value added in half
(from 40 to 20 percent), the optimal dismissal rate remains over 70 percent.

The Effect of Changing the Time to Tenure Review
In our next set of simulations, we evaluate how changing the time until tenure review
affects the optimal dismissal rate and the average value added of teachers. The first column of
Table 2 repeats the results from our benchmark simulations in which dismissal could only occur
at the end of the first year. The next three columns allow the principal to delay tenure review
until the second, third, or fourth year, and to gather more information about teacher effectiveness
before making a decision regarding dismissal. The next three columns require a delay in tenure
review for 2 to 4 years, so that dismissal can occur only after multiple years of value-added data
are available to the principal.
Not surprisingly, giving a principal the option of waiting to gather more information
produces some benefits. Average value added rises to about 0.10 standard deviations with the
possibility of delaying tenure review to the fourth year, with most of the gain coming from
delaying tenure until the second year. Even with the option to delay the tenure decision, the
principal would still dismiss two-thirds of new hires after the first year, but would wait to
dismiss some teachers for whom there is a reasonable chance that an additional year of data
could lead to a better decision. Intuitively, the cut-off score for dismissing a new teacher rises
with time on the job, because the option value of waiting to dismiss a teacher declines as the
principal accumulates better information. In other words, to avoid unnecessary turnover the
principal may choose to wait a year before dismissing a teacher who the principal believes is
“below the bar” so long as there is a reasonable chance that this evaluation could change. Thus,
the principal dismisses teachers whose expected effectiveness lies below a bar that increases with
teacher experience. Overall dismissal rates do not change much as the principal is allowed to
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wait until year 2, 3, or 4 to make a decision, but the extra time allows the principal to better
identify the remaining subset of teachers for tenure.
In contrast, requiring principals to delay tenure review—that is, removing the option of
dismissal until year 2, 3, or 4—would lead to lower average teacher value added, relative to the
baseline case. Essentially, this policy forces principals to retain low-performing teachers
additional years, and this outweighs the benefits of the additional information the principal
would obtain by waiting to see additional years of performance data. Note that this policy also
leads to fewer teachers being dismissed overall, since the option value of hiring a new teacher
(who may turn out to be ineffective and must be retained for several years) has fallen.

Obtaining More Reliable Information at the Time of Hire
We have assumed that principals have no useful information at the time of hire. This
implies that radical increases in hiring rates (as required by a dismissal rate of 80 percent) do not
affect the quality of new hires—each individual is a random draw from a generally qualified
applicant pool. But many districts and principals put substantial effort into screening and
interviewing new hires, suggesting that even small amounts of information at the time of hire
may be valuable.
Figure 2 shows how changing the reliability of the pre-hire signal affects the optimal
dismissal rate (right axis, dashed line), and the resulting value added of the average teacher in the
school (left axis, solid line). For these simulations, we assumed that the principal could only
dismiss teachers after the first year (T = 1). We also assumed that the pool of potential applicants
was ten times the number needed to replace teachers leaving through exogenous turnover,
corresponding to estimates that New York City and Los Angeles currently have about 10
applicants for each position. Our baseline simulation corresponds to a reliability of 0 in the prehire signal, at the far left in this figure.
Figure 2 suggests that pre-hire information on teacher effectiveness is potentially quite
valuable. Compared to having no information at the time of hire, a perfect pre-hire signal with
100 percent reliability would nearly triple the gain to the value added of the teacher workforce,
and of course would eliminate the need to dismiss teachers after hire. More interestingly, even a
low reliability signal of 20 percent at the time of hire doubles the gain to the value added of the
teacher workforce relative to the benchmark case with no pre-hire information. However, access
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to a pre-hire signal does not eliminate the need to dismiss additional teachers after hire. As long
as there is remaining uncertainty about teacher effectiveness among the teachers that are hired,
there will be a benefit to dismissing additional teachers after observing classroom performance.

Obtaining More Reliable Measures of On-the-Job Performance
Figure 3 shows how changing the reliability of the on-the-job signal affects the optimal
timing of tenure (regions delineated by dotted lines, labeled at top), the optimal dismissal rate
(right axis, dashed line), and the resulting value added of the average teacher in the school (left
axis, solid line). For these simulations, we assumed that the principal could only dismiss teachers
at tenure time (T).
Many school districts are currently engaged in efforts to improve the reliability with
which they can measure teacher performance, through the use of additional information from
classroom observation, student work, and student or parent surveys. Figure 3 suggests that more
reliable measures of teacher performance are quite valuable. Relative to our baseline simulation,
in which the reliability of the annual performance measure was 40 percent (.4 in the figure), a
measure with perfect reliability would nearly double the gains from selecting effective teachers
(to 0.14 standard deviations) while having little impact on the proportion of teachers dismissed.
If districts relied on performance measures that were less reliable than our baseline case, the
gains from selecting effective teachers would be reduced, and it would become optimal for the
principal to wait longer before dismissing a teacher. Interestingly, the proportion of teachers
dismissed does not decline much until the reliability of the performance measure drops below 5
percent (.05 in the figure). Even very weak signals of teacher performance eventually identify
differences between teachers that make the benefits of selectively awarding tenure swamp the
cost of having to hire additional inexperienced teachers.

Conclusion
In the ongoing debate over how to improve teaching quality in public schools, there have
been conflicting claims regarding the usefulness of currently available measures of teacher
effectiveness. For example, in reference to a proposed initiative to measure teacher effectiveness
using student test scores, the head of the New York City teachers’ union Randi Weingarten
stated: “There is no way that any of this current data could actually, fairly, honestly or with any
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integrity be used to isolate the contributions of an individual teacher” (as reported by Medina,
2008). In contrast, the U.S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan (2009) has stated: “I have an
open mind about teacher evaluation, but we need to find a way to measure classroom success and
teacher effectiveness. Pretending that student outcomes are not part of the equation is like
pretending that professional basketball has nothing to do with the score.”
Given the available evidence, we have tried to evaluate systematically how school leaders
should use the currently available but imperfect measures of teacher effectiveness to recruit,
evaluate, and retain teachers. Our simulations suggest that using existing information on teacher
performance to aggressively select teachers would yield substantial annual gains in academic
achievement of around 0.08 student level standard deviations. These are comparable to the
annual test score gains found in recent experimental evaluations of charter schools (Hoxby and
Murarka, 2009; Abdulkadiroglu, Angrist, Dynarski, Kane, and Pathak, 2009) and comparable to
the estimated annual impact of reducing class size in early elementary grades found in Project
STAR (Krueger, 1999). Our analysis also suggests that there are substantial returns to investing
in better information about teacher effectiveness, both at the time of hire and in the first few
years on the job. Other measures of teacher performance, such as evaluations based on classroom
observations, may be very useful. Finally, there may be other uses of this information that we did
not consider in our analysis, such as for performance-based pay or targeted professional
development, which would yield even larger gains. Systematically exploring the potential gains
from these other uses would be valuable.
There are many practical obstacles to implementing a policy that denies tenure to a large
proportion of new teachers. First, large upfront investments in teaching credentials make very
high rates of terminations hard to support in equilibrium. Given that there is little evidence that
such credentials are related to teacher effectiveness, our results suggest that an aggressive
dismissal policy should be complimented by an easy entry policy. For example, as an alternative
to obtaining credentials, districts could create an alternative port of entry in which any college
graduate (without a criminal record) could become certified if they performed well on the job in
their first year or two. One could imagine such an alternative certification route being an
attractive option for many applicants, and the teachers obtaining the resulting certification being
highly valued by schools. If applicants were still uneasy about investing time and effort in the
difficult first years of teaching, districts could redesign the process to limit the up-front costs of a
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“tryout” (for example, initially evaluating new teachers using brief summer school courses), and
allow them to gain better pre-hire information at low cost.. Similarly, it is interesting to consider
a workforce development model that tries both to minimize the exposure of students to untested
teachers and generate early-career information on teacher effectiveness. For example, instead of
giving new teachers a full load of students and/or courses, principals could assign them to a
small group of students or a single course and then use this limited teaching role to collect
performance information.10 Of course, we do not know how reliably such information would
predict later performance with a full set of teaching responsibilities, but we suspect it would be
more informative than knowing where someone attended college or what they scored on a
standardized certification examination.
Despite these issues and obstacles, the general message of our analysis remains. The
current system, which focuses on credentials at the time of hire and grants tenure as a matter of
course, is at odds with decades of evidence on teacher effectiveness. Instead, teacher recruitment
and retention policies should focus on improving our methods of teacher evaluation and use
admittedly imperfect measures of teacher effectiveness to identify and retain only the best
teachers early in their teaching careers.
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Table 1
Evidence on Teacher Value Added from Schools in Los Angeles and New York City
(teacher value added measured in standard deviations of student performance)
Los Angeles
English
Language
Math
Arts

New York City
English
Language
Math
Arts

0.27

0.23

0.25

0.23

0.50

0.37

0.39

0.28

0.19

0.14

0.15

0.12

–0.08

–0.06

–0.07

–0.07

One year of experience teaching

–0.02

–0.01

–0.03

–0.04

Two years of experience teaching

–0.01

–0.01

–0.02

–0.02

Variation in Teacher Value Added:
Standard deviation of annual value-added
measure
Reliability of annual value-added measure
Implied standard deviation of persistent
teacher effect
Difference in Value Added Relative to
Teachers with 3+ Years Experience:
No experience teaching (novice)

Notes: Teacher value-added estimates are from analysis of data on 4th and 5th graders in years
2000–2003 for Los Angeles and 2000–2005 for New York City. Teacher value added is
measured in standard deviations of student performance. Reliability of the value-added measure
refers to the correlation of the value-added measure across classrooms taught by the same
teacher. Estimates are based on regressions of student achievement that include student-level
controls for baseline test scores, race/ethnicity, special education, English Language Learners
(ELL), and free lunch status; classroom peer means of the student-level characteristics; and
grade-by-year fixed effects.
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Figure 1
Effect of Dismissing a Given Proportion of Novice Teachers Based on One Year of Data
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Average value added
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Proportion novice

Notes: Proportion dismissed (x-axis) refers to the proportion of teachers with the lowest valueadded estimates that are dismissed after their first year. The solid line (and left axis) shows the
steady state impact of each proportion dismissed on the value added of the average teacher,
including those in their first year of teaching. Teacher value added is measured in standard
deviations of student performance. The dashed line (and right axis) shows the steady state impact
of each proportion dismissed on the proportion of the teacher workforce in the first (or novice)
year of teaching.
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Table 2
Effect of Delaying Tenure Decisions beyond the First Year, Options vs. Requirements
Baseline:
Dismissal at
T =1
T =1

Dismissal allowed at
any time until
T =2
T =3
T =4

Require dismissal
only occur at time
T =2
T =3
T =4

Average value added

0.080

0.095

0.099

0.101

0.075

0.068

0.061

% Dismissed overall
% Dismissed annually
At T = 1
At T = 2
At T = 3
At T = 4

81%

83%

84%

84%

75%

71%

68%

81%

67%
16%

67%
8%
9%

67%
8%
4%
5%

75%
71%
68%

Notes: Average value added refers to the average level of teachers' value-added estimates in the
steady state under an optimal dismissal policy, and it includes both untenured and tenured
teachers. (Teacher value added is measured in standard deviations of student performance.)
“Percentages dismissed” refers to the percent of a single cohort of newly hired teachers
dismissed during years leading up to when a tenure decision is required (year T).
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Figure 2
Effect of Increasing the Reliability of the Pre-hire Performance Signal on Value Added of
Average Teacher and Proportion of Teachers Dismissed after One Year
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Note: Reliability (x-axis) refers to the proportion of variance in the pre-hire performance signal
that is due to the persistent component of teacher performance. The solid line (and left axis)
shows the steady state impact of reliability on the value added of the average teacher, including
those in their first year of teaching, based on the optimal proportion of teachers dismissed after
one year. (Teacher value added is measured in standard deviations of student performance.) The
dashed line (and right axis) shows the steady state impact of reliability on the optimal proportion
dismissed after one year.
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Figure 3
Effect of Reliability of the Annual Performance Measure on Optimal Timing of Tenure,
Optimal Dismissal Rate, and Value Added of Average Teacher
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Note: Figure 3 shows how changing the reliability of the on-the-job signal affects the optimal
timing of tenure (regions delineated by dotted lines, labeled at top), the optimal dismissal rate
(right axis, dashed line), and the resulting value added of the average teacher in the school (left
axis, solid line). For these simulations, we assumed that the principal could only dismiss teachers
at tenure time (T). Reliability (x-axis) refers to the correlation of the annual performance measure
across years within the same teacher. The dashed line (and right axis) shows the steady state
impact of reliability on the proportion dismissed. The solid line (and left axis) shows the steady
state impact of reliability on the value added of the average teacher, including those in their first
year of teaching, based on the optimal proportion of teachers dismissed after the optimal waiting
period (T). (Teacher value added is measured in standard deviations of student performance.)
The regions separated by horizontal dotted lines denote the optimal year in which the tenure
decision should be made (T) for different levels of reliability.
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